Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015)
Volume 22

Issue 2

Article 4

2006

An Essential Prescription: Why Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience
Clauses Are Necessary
Brian P. Knestout

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp

Recommended Citation
Brian P. Knestout, An Essential Prescription: Why Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience Clauses Are
Necessary, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 349 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol22/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

AN ESSENTIAL PRESCRIPTION:
WHY PHARMACIST-INCLUSIVE CONSCIENCE
CLAUSES ARE NECESSARY

Brian P. Knestout

l

Four states, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Dakota, have
enacted statutes specifically protecting pharmacists from liability for
refusing to fill birth control pill or emergency contraception pill ("ECP")
prescriptions. 2 At least 14 other states have considered, or are considering,
similar legislation.3 These pharmacist-specific statutes are closely related to
existing "conscience clause" 4 statutes, passed in 46 states, which protect
or assist in procedures
medical professionals who do not wish to perform
5
related to abortion, sterilization, or euthanasia.

1. J.D. candidate, 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A., B.A. 1991, Villanova University, Villanova Pa.; M.A. 1995, University of
Delaware. The author would like to thank Prof. George P. Smith, II for his help in
conceiving and executing this Comment. The author also wishes to thank his wife,
Catherine Tramontana, his daughter, Teresa, and his son, Luke, for their forgiveness of
his absences on so many nights and weekends.
2. See ARK. CODE ANN. §20-16-304(4) (2005); id. §20-16-601(a) (2005); GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. R. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b), -5(1) (2004);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §36-11-70 (2003).
3. Tresa Baldas, Fighting Refusal to Treat 'Conscience' Clauses Hit the Courts,
NAT'L L. J., Feb. 7, 2005, at 1, 1; National Conference of State Legislatures, Pharmacist
Conscience Clauses: Laws and Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/
conscienceclauses.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
4. Depending on the political spectrum of the individual, the phrase "conscience
clause" is a debatable point in itself; those who find such statutes problematic often refer
to them as "refusal clauses." Since a large portion of the legal literature uses the term
"conscience clause," this paper will refer to such clauses with that terminology.
5. For a comprehensive review of state conscience clause statutes, see Lynn D.
Wardle, Protectingthe Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
177 (1993).
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The broader conscience clause statutes that generally cover medical
professionals vary in specificity, and some may also cover pharmacists with6
regard to abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, and possibly other procedures.
However, if pharmacists rely on conscience clauses that-upon judicial
inquiry-are determined not to cover pharmacists, such professionals would
have no shield from liability for actions taken to protect their morally or
religiously held beliefs. The newer statutes recognize that pharmacists play
a vital role in the health care system, distinct from other types of care
providers, and consequently require separate protections. The statutes in
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Dakota are designed specifically
to protect the rights of conscience of pharmacists, with regard to abortion,
7
emergency contraception, assisted suicide, euthanasia, or all four actions.
Since the regulation of the pharmaceutical and medical professions is
reserved to the states by the 10th Amendment, conscience clauses are
constitutionally permissible. Common law police power doctrine recognizes
that states have the power to enact laws for the preservation of the health,
safety, and welfare of the people, provided that those laws do not conflict
with superseding federal, or constitutional, law. 8
Neither the 14th
Amendment's protections of access to birth control and abortion, nor any
individual's First Amendment right to free exercise of
9 religion, compel or
forbid the existence of such liability-shielding statutes.
The continued existence of more generally applicable conscience clauses,
including both state and federal statutes,' 0 suggests concern by legislatures
over the types of ethical dilemmas that can impact providers of medical care.
However, considering the central role that pharmacists play in the modem
American health care system, an interesting question is why pharmacist-

6. The definitions of "health care provider" in both the Illinois and Mississippi laws
are extremely broad and would cover the actions of pharmacists who refuse to fill valid
prescriptions for any moral or religious reason. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1-14
(2004) (the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act) and MISS. CODE ANN. § 41107-1 to -13 (2004) (the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act).

7. The South Dakota law, passed in 1998, was the first such pharmacist-specific
statute in the nation and explicitly covers all four procedures. The Arkansas statute,
originally passed in 1973 to cover doctors, nurses and other medical personnel, was
amended in 2001 to include pharmacists and covers abortion and contraception. See
ARK. CODE ANN. and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, supra note 2.

8.

AM.

1997-98 POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT ON PHARMACIST
10-11 (1998) [hereinafter APHA POLICY REPORT].
9. See CATHERINE WEIS ET AL., ACLU, RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS 6 (2002), availableat http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF911 .pdf.
10. See Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph for Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. §300a-7 (2004) did not violate the establishment clause).
PHARMACISTS Ass'N,

CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
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specific clauses are not nearly as prevalent among states that have
conscience clauses that protect other health care providers.
In Wisconsin, for instance, the governor vetoed an expansion of the state's
existing conscience clause because it would have given too much latitude to
health care providers to withdraw from medically-approved procedures, such
as euthanasia and fetal tissue research, for moral or religious reasons."
Specific coverage for pharmacists in the bill, which would have allowed
them to refuse to dispense ECP, had been removed from the bill before its
passage by the legislature. 12 The dropped coverage of pharmacists actually
left one pro-life group in the unusual situation of protesting a bill they had
originally championed.13
The source of such clauses' apparent unpopularity may spring from
several unique questions posed at the intersection of existing law, advancing
medical science, and changing social conceptions of health care. These
questions arise in any effort to stretch a more generic conscience clause to
cover the profession of pharmacy with regard to providing a patient with
ECP or another drug upon receipt of a validly written prescription. Such
questions include: do pharmacists qualify as medical professionals with
regard to the existing conscience clauses? What role do pharmacists play in
the medical procedures of abortion and contraception? And, perhaps most
importantly, from a public policy perspective, who has the final decision
regarding what medication is given to patients-pharmacists, physicians, or
patients? Providing carte blanche protection to pharmacists from dispensing
ECP or abortifacient drugs on religious or moral grounds, a right protected
by the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause, may conflict with a
patient's right to control her fertility, protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause. The ensuing collision, played out in state
courts, suggests a heady, complicated balance of interests.
This Comment will examine the unique conflicts that advances in
pharmacological science and social conceptions of medicine have created for
pharmacists with respect to the emerging flashpoint of prescriptions for ECP
and abortifacient drugs. Section I will establish the scope of the dilemma in
which pharmacists with moral qualms about emergency birth control find
themselves. It will introduce the topic in light of a handful of recent
incidents involving pharmacists who have refused to dispense birth control
pills to people with valid prescriptions. It will explore the science of ECP

See Stacy Forster, "Conscience Clause" Passes Assembly, MILWAUKEE J.
Feb. 25, 2004, at 03B; Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Doyle to Veto
"Conscience Clause", MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2004, at 01A.
12. See Stacy Forster, Women's Health Debate Intensifies, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Apr. 21, 2004, at 0lB.
I.

SENTINEL,

13.

Walters & Marley, supra note 11.
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and the physiological effects of such drugs, examine the modem patientcentered view of medicine and the pharmacy profession's own view of itself
(a view which has undergone a metamorphosis in recent years away from a
mere functionalism toward a more holistic, patient-care-oriented approach),
and review the existing ethical codes of pharmacists.
Section II will review the constitutional basis of the rights of the patient to
birth control and abortion in 14th Amendment Due Process Clause
jurisprudence, reviewing Griswold v. Connecticut,14 Eisenstadt v. Baird,15
Roe v. Wade, 16 and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.17 It will also review the
constitutional basis of a pharmacist's right to free exercise of religion in the
First Amendment from two perspectives. First, as individuals, pharmacists
have the right to practice religion so long as the practice does not violate the
rights of others (as elucidated in Reynolds v. United States, 18 Cantwell v.
Connecticut,19 and Braunfeld v. Brown2 ) and so long as neutral, generally
applicable laws are followed (Employment Div. v. Smith21). Second, as
employees,22 pharmacists have a right to the accommodation of their
religious beliefs by their employers unless the accommodation imposes an
undue burden on the business (TWA v. Hardison 3).
Section Ill reviews statutory and common law protections for pharmacists.
It examines the pharmacy conscience clause of South Dakota and the
broader medical provider conscience clause of Texas, which would not
likely cover pharmacists. This section focuses on the wording and
construction of the statutes that define the scope of duty and the nature of
any applicable conscience clause. It also touches upon existing 24 and
proposed 25 federal "conscience clause" provisions, and delves into common

14.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

15.
16.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

17.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

18.
19.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).

20.
21.

366 U.S. 599 (1961).
494 U.S. 872, rehearingdenied 496 U.S. 913 (1990).

22.

Self-employed or independent pharmacists would not labor under this restriction

since, by definition, they are not employees. However, given the prevalence of chain
pharmacies, many pharmacists are affected by this line of case law, and it will be
considered the default mode of modem pharmacy.
23. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
24. See 42 U.S.C. §300a-7 (2005), which provides an exception for those involved
with federally-funded programs who refuse to perform or assist in abortions.
25. S. 893, The Workplace Religious Freedom Act ("WRFA") currently before the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions The WRFA would amend Title VII
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law doctrines that impose or excuse pharmacists from duties owed to the
public.
Section IV will examine how state and federal courts have reconciled
conflicts between medical professionals or public safety officers and patients
with regard to ECP and abortion. Finally, Section V will highlight
competing policy interests within the issue-concluding that pharmacistspecific conscience clauses are necessary to protect pharmacists who have
ethical concerns regarding specific pharmaceutical regimens.

I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: PHARMACY, MEDICINE AND THE
MECHANICS OF EMERGENCY BIRTH CONTROL

A. FactualEvents
Early in 2004, a rape victim entered an Eckerd pharmacy in the small
town of Denton, Texas, and had her request to fill a drug prescription denied
by the pharmacist on duty. 26 The woman had a valid prescription for
mifepristone, 27 which is also called Mifeprix or RU-486. 28 The pharmacist
on duty, Gene Herr, refused to fill the prescription, citing his religious
beliefs that life begins at conception and that filling the prescription would
possibly make him complicit in an abortion. 29 Herr was fired by Eckerd for
violating a company policy that requires pharmacists to fill prescriptions
regardless of their moral or religious beliefs.3 °
Herr was not the only pharmacist to be disciplined for refusing to dispense
a valid prescription.
A Wisconsin pharmacist, Neil Noesen, faced
disciplinary action after refusing to fill a valid prescription for birth control,
transfer the prescription to another pharmacy, or return the written

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§701(j), 703, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j), 2000e-2 (2005), to
include protection in the workplace for religious accommodation.
26. Associated Press, Denial of Rape Victim's Pills Raises Debate, Feb. 24, 2004,
availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4359430/print/l/displaymode/1098.
27.

Id.

28. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MIFEPREX (IFEPRISTONE) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Aug. 2005), http://www.fda.gov/
cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/mifepristone-qa.htm;
FEDERATION

OF

AM.,

MIFEPRISTONE:

ExPANDING

PLANNED
WOMEN'S

OPTIONS

PARENTHOOD
FOR EARLY

ABORTION (May 2006), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/

medicalin fo/abortion/fact-early-abortion-mifepristone.xml.
29. Associated Press, supra note 26.
30. Id.

354
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31

prescription to the patient so that it could be filled at another pharmacy.
Karen Brauer, an Indiana pharmacist and president of Pharmacists for Life
International, 32 an interest group made up of pro-life pharmacists, 3 3 was
fired from K-mart after refusing to fill a valid prescription for a drug which
she believed could possibly be used for a purpose that violated her religious
beliefs.34
John Boling, the pharmacy manager of a Temecula, California drug store,
was reprimanded by his employer in 199735 for refusing to fill a prescription
for ECP presented by a married woman with a history of difficult
pregnancies who was concerned about becoming pregnant again.
The
woman complained to the store manager and regional officials, and filled the
prescription at another pharmacy. 37 The California State Board of Pharmacy
refused to discipline3 8Boling, however, since no regulation mandated that he
fill the prescription.

B. The Drugs
The volatile reaction between a pharmacist's duty to his or her patient on
one side of the counter and the pharmacist's conscience on the other, already
brewing with regard to ECP, was catalyzed by the approval of mifepristone
39
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September, 2000.
Mifepristone blocks the body's absorption of progesterone, which is
necessary for pregnancy to progress normally. 40 Blocking progesterone
absorption induces the shedding of the uterine lining and ends any possible

31. Carol Ukens, Confrontation at the Counter, DRUG Topics, July 26, 2004,
http://www.drugtopics.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id= 107992.
32. Id.
33. See Pharmacists for Life International, http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli
=aboutus (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
34. Ukens, supra note 31.
35.

Joe Vargo, Temecula PharmacistDisciplined,PRESS ENTERPRISE, Mar. 26, 1997,

at B04.
36. Joe Vargo, Pharmacists' Association Defends Pill Denial, PRESS
Mar. 28, 1997, at B01.
37.

ENTERPRISE,

Id.

38.
39.

Id.
HHS News, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., FDA Approves Mifespristone
for the Termination of Early Pregnancy (Sept. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/NEW00737.html.
40.

See MIFEPREX (IFEPRISTONE) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 28.
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pregnancy. 4 1 The medication is not available over the counter; it induces
heavy bleeding and, consequently, must be prescribed by a doctor, who
42
monitors the patient closely after it is administered.
Mifepristone was approved for use in ending early pregnancies-those
that have not progressed past 49 days-but the drug has a number of other
uses, including contraception.43 When taken in conjunction with another
drug, misoprostol (a synthetic version of the hormone prostaglandin),
mifepristone can induce an abortion. 44 Thus, mifepristone can be used as
both an emergency contraceptive (which blocks implantation of a fertilized
egg) and an abortifacient (which expels a fertilized and implanted egg from
the womb). Currently in the United States, it is only approved for chemical
abortions, not as an ECP regimen.4 5
ECP is a slightly different story. An ECP regimen consists primarily of
the same active ingredients in ordinary birth control pills.4 6 These pills use
either a combination of estrogen-progestogen, called the Yuzpe regimen, or
progestogen only formulations, known as Plan B. 4 7 They are taken in higher
dosages than that used for regular contraception.48 Plan B appears to be
somewhat more effective, and carries fewer side effects such as nausea and
vomiting, than the Yuzpe regimen. 49 If taken within 72 hours of unprotected

41.

Progesterone, along with estrogen, stimulate the development of the uterus'

endometrial lining (which develops into the placenta during pregnancy). Without
progesterone, the uterus sheds this endometrial lining. See Adam.com, Body Guide,
http://www.besthealth.comlbesthealth/bodyguide/reftextihtmlrepr sys-fin.html
(last
visited Aug. 2, 2006).
42. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
Mifepristone Medication Guide (Aug. 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/

mifepristone/medguide.htm. Good communication between doctors and patients taking
mifeprix is critical. The FDA issued a Public Health Advisory in March, 2006, due to
possible sepsis-related deaths of several women who had taken mifepristone to terminate
pregnancy. FDA Public Health Advisory, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Sepsis and
Medical Abortion Update (March 17, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
advisory/mifeprex200603.htm.
43.

Id.

44.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD,

supra note 28.

45. Abigail Norris Turner & Charlotte Ellertson,
Contraception?,25 DRUG SAFETY 695, 695 (2002).
46.
47.

Id.
Id.; see also Am.

Contraception,ACOG

Coll. of Obstetrics

PRACTICE BULLETIN,

&

How Safe is Emergency

Gynecology, Emergency Oral

March 2001, at 1, 1 (2001).

48.

Turner & Ellertson, supranote 45, at 695.

49.

Am. Coll. of Obstetrics & Gynecology, supra note 47, at 3-4.
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intercourse, such dru~s have been shown to be 75% to 85% effective in
preventing pregnancy.
The time factor for taking ECP medication is critical. Studies indicate that
the effectiveness of ECP, whichever regimen is applied, falls after the initial
72 hour period. 51 As a result, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists recommend that the first
dose of ECP be taken as soon as
52
possible after unprotected intercourse.
Having an ECP regimen readily accessible through a prior prescription
appears to increase the likelihood that women will use the drugs to avoid
unplanned pregnancy. 53 This likelihood, along with the general health-safety
of the drugs, may be a reason behind an independent panel of the FDA
54
recommending approval of Plan B for over-the-counter (OTC) sales.
Currently, the FDA has postponed making a final decision on whether such
medications should be available OTC.55 It has already rejected one request
for OTC status, citing insufficient data56 on possible consequences of selling
the drug over the counter to teenagers.

C. ChangingFace of Modern Medicine and Changing Role of Pharmacists
Making an ECP regimen available without a prescription would bypass
the gatekeeper function of the pharmacist and eliminate the need for a
conscience clause with respect to this type of drug. The advocacy of, and
resistance to, such a move by the FDA also highlights two opposing views
of the profession of pharmacy, the conflict of which contributes to the root
problem facing today's pharmacists: are pharmacists mere retail
functionaries who simply and somewhat robotically pull the appropriate
bottle off the shelf, and who therefore can be easily removed from the
distribution chain by making drugs available over-the-counter, or are they
professionals expected to exercise independent judgment and charged with a
duty to safeguard public health?

50.
51.

Turner & Ellertson, supra note 45, at 695.
Am. Coll. of Obstetrics & Gynecology, supra note 47, at 5.

52.

Id.

53. Id.
54. Leila Abboud, FDA Panel Favors Nonprescription 'Morning After' Pill, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at BI.
55. News Release, Barr Pharm., Inc., FDA Decision on Plan B(R) OTC Status
Delayed (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=60908
&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=665477&highlight=.
56.
A3.

Leila Abboud, FDA Restricts 'Morning After' Pill,WALL ST. J., May 7, 2004, at
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While the public may tend to think of pharmacists in terms of the former,
and while such a functionalism may have been the prior dominant mode of
the profession, the parameters of a pharmacist's responsibility are currently
in flux. The practice of pharmacy finds itself in a watershed moment
requiring "a change in the orientation of traditional professional attitudes
and re-engineering of the traditional pharmacy environment." 57 The entire
profession is trendin away from a mere robotic functionalism toward active
patient consultation. 58
Pharmacists recognize that their professional role places them in a
position of responsibility, requiring them to act as a screen to deny
improperly requested drugs and to dispense properly requested drugs to
patients who are in the care of appropriately licensed and authorized
physicians. 59 Since many of the drugs can be deadly, and others can be used
as narcotics, pharmacists have a duty to society to weed out illicit requests
for drugs from licit requests. 6 0 This duty includes the responsibility to screen
seemingly valid prescriptions to make sure they have been prescribed for a
legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of a particular
prescriber's practice. Such a weighty burden makes pharmacists "mindful
of their gatekeeper position at the end of a long chain of drug distribution
and of their responsibility
to not provide drug diverters with easy access to
62
this closed system."
In return for their monopoly on drug distribution, society expects
pharmacists to act responsibly, withholding improperly requested
medications while providing properly requested ones. 63 Such an expectation
is a logical source of a functionalist view of the profession. But the legal
duties that pharmacists must fulfill have increased. If an error occurs despite
the pharmacist's valid exercise of his gate-keeping duty, courts are reluctant
to find the pharmacist liable under the common law of many states for
accurately filling prescriptions that result in harm to the patient. 64 However,

57.

American Pharmacists Association, Principles of Practice of Pharmaceutical

Care, http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=PharmacyPractice Resources
&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=2906 (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
58. APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.

59.

Id., at 1,3.

60. David B. Brushwood, From Confrontation to Collaboration: Collegial
Accountability and the Expanding Role of Pharmacists in the Management of Chronic
Pain, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHics 69, 69 (2001).
61. William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, PharmaceuticallyAssisted Death and
the Pharmacist'sRight of Conscience, 5 J. PHARM. & L. 1, 3 (1996).
62. Brushwood, supra note 60, at 69.
63. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 61, at 2.
64. See generally David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Pharmacist Who
Accurately Fills Prescriptionfor Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R. 5th 393 (1996).
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courts have held, to varying degrees, that pharmacists may have a duty to
warn their patients 65of the possible harmful or lethal effects of accurately
filled prescriptions.
The imposition of this new duty has expanded beyond state court rulings.
Federal standards now require pharmacists to review every prescription
filled for a Medicaid patient for potential pitfalls including drug interactions,
drug incompatibilities, patient allergies, and fraud.66 Pharmacists must also
review medications with patients; exercise their own judgment, based on
training and experience, in discussing prescription-related issues with
patients; and track medical information on patients. 67 In sum, "the result of
this expansion in standards of practice is that pharmacists are expected to
think about the appropriateness of a patient's drug therapy, to intervene
when there is a potential problem, and to assure that the patient is fully
empowered to use the medications safely and effectively." 68
Thus,
pharmacists appear to have two parallel duties: one toward society as a
whole, and one toward each patient who steps up to the counter.

D. PharmacistEthics
In the Temecula, California incident, the company that operated the
pharmacy had a policy that any pharmacist with a moral objection to filling a
prescription must refer the prescription to another pharmacist on duty or to
another pharmacy entirely if necessary. 69
Such a referral policy
foreshadowed the American Pharmacists Association's ("APhA")
subsequent issuance of a formal policy regarding pharmacist conscience
clauses. 70 APhA is the primary professional association of pharmacists in
the United States.7 ' Issued after the Temecula incident in 1998, the policy
addresses the professional duties of pharmacists faced with dispensing a
drug to which they object for religious or moral reasons.72

65. Id.; see also Happel v. Walmart Stores, 766 N.E.2d 1118 (111.2002).
66. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (1990), codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.; See also APHA POLICY REPORT,
supra note 8.
67. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 61, at 4.
68. Id at 4.
69.

Morning-After Pill: PharmacistsMight Not Dispense, ABORTION REPORT, Apr.

24, 1997.
See APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8.
71. See American Pharmacists Association., About APhA, http://www.aphanet.org/
AM/Template.cfn?Section=About APhA (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
72. APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
70.
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Pharmacists are expected, both by professional policy and in state law, to
refuse from engaging in activities that conflict with their professional
judgment. 73 With the release of its 1998 Policy Report, the APhA
announced an official stance to support the decision of pharmacists who
refuse to fill a valid prescription for moral or ethical reasons. It thereby
recognizes the existence of a third duty, one that is not legally binding but
which has a degree of legal protection-a duty of a pharmacist to protect his
or her own moral and religious beliefs.
However, the APhA stance urges pharmacists who refuse to fill a
prescription on moral or ethical grounds to fulfill their responsibility to the
patient in some other way. 74 The most logical alternative is to refer the
patient to another pharmacist or pharmacy that can fill the prescription. 75 In
this way, the APhA attempts to balance the needs of the patient and the
individual pharmacist and helps prevent the pharmacist from asserting a
paternalistic relationship over the patient through the imposition of his or her
own moral viewpoint.
Pharmacists understand that they have a duty to prioritize their patients'
interests.77 The patient's individual autonomy is to be respected, as are any
differences in cultural or personal backgrounds. Thus, upon acceptance of a
validly written prescription, pharmacists consider themselves to have an
78
The patient's goals,
ethical duty to provide the patient with the medicine.
nevertheless, should be the overriding priority for the pharmacist.
Putting the patient's interests first flows from the set of goals that
pharmacists aim to achieve, as espoused in the APhA's Code of Ethics. The
Code of Ethics is based upon longstanding principles of biomedical ethics
79
including respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, and beneficence.
Personal autonomy is the freedom from controlling interference of another
and from external constraints that prevent the ability to make a meaningful
choice. 8° Non-maleficence is the avoidance of inflicting harm, commonly

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77. American Pharmacists Association, Principles of Practice of Pharmaceutical
Care, supra note 57; see also Allen & Brushwood, supra note 61, at 2.
78.

STEPHANIE E. HARVEY ET AL., Do PHARMACISTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO

DISPENSE A PRESCRIPTION BASED ON PERSONAL BELIEFS?, available at http://www.nm-

pharmacy.com/bodyrights.htm.
79. American Pharmacists Association, Principles of Practice of Pharmaceutical
Care, supra note 57; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001).

80.

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 79, at 58.

360
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referred to as the Hippocratic oath.8 1 Beneficence is the concept of actively
preventing harm or providing a benefit to another person. 82 Recognizing that
each principle applies to the pharmacist-patient relationship, the Code
declares that a pharmacist "respects the autonomy and dignity of each
patient," that he "avoids... actions that compromise dedication to the best
interests of patients," and that he "promotes the good of every patient in a
83
caring, compassionate and confidential manner."

E. Conflicting Views of the Beginning ofLife, and the Resulting Problem
What does it mean to promote the good of every patient? The ethical
principles guiding pharmacists may conflict with regard to filling ECP
prescriptions, due to competing views of conception and the beginning of
life. If the pharmacist follows the prevailing medical opinion that life begins
upon implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterine lining (as the American
Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists hold),8 4 providing ECP could enable a person to avoid an
unplanned pregnancy by averting conception. If a pharmacist, due to moral,
religious or philosophical beliefs, holds that life begins at the earlier moment
of fertilization (as some religious faiths hold) , providing ECP to a woman
after she has had intercourse could induce an abortion either by blocking
implantation of a fertilized egg or by inducing menstruation after
implantation.
For both ECP and RU-486, a pharmacist plays a key role in delivering the
drug to the patient-since neither medicine is available over-the-counter, the
patient must go through the pharmacist to obtain either of them. And if that
pharmacist has moral questions or reservations about engaging in an
abortion in some fashion, even indirectly, he is caught between a rock of

81. Id. at 113.
82. Id. at 165.
83. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 61, at 1; American Pharmacists Association,
Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, http://www.aphanet.org/AMiTemplate.cfm?Section
=Pharmacy PracticeResources&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=2903
(last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
84. Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of
Conception in Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 294 (1998).
85.

See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, pt. 3, § 2, ch. 2, art. 5,

2270,

available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm ("Human life must
be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first
moment of [its] existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a
person-among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.")
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their own moral code and the hard place of their duty to provide drugs to the
patient.
The APhA suggests a compromise, supporting a pharmacist who wishes
to withdraw from a particular transaction, but holding that the pharmacist's
duty to the patient continues in strength and that the pharmacist must refer
86
the prescription to another pharmacist or pharmacy for processing.
However, passing along a prescription could nevertheless force a pharmacist
to violate his or her ethical principles by facilitating an action that they find
morally objectionable. 7 If a pharmacist believes that pregnancy begins at
conception, and that the prescription would terminate an existing pregnancy,
filling the prescription would violate the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence by killing the patient's 89child.88 However, this action seemingly
undermines the patient's autonomy.
How, then, should a pharmacist, or a court faced with a pharmacist who
has refused to fill a validly written prescription, decide between conflicting
duties to patient, to society, and to self? Does a pharmacist have any right,
outside of a conscience clause statute that provides an escape hatch, to refuse
to provide the prescription? The process of answering these questions must
begin by examining the rights of both parties in the transaction: patient and
pharmacist.

II.

RIGHTS OF THE PATIENT AND PHARMACIST: 1ST AND 14TH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

A. 14th Amendment Jurisprudence-TheRights of the Patient
An individual's constitutionally protected right to birth control was
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut
opinion. 90 Griswold, the director of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut,
provided information, instruction and medical advice to married couples
regarding contraception. In so doing he ran afoul of two separate

86. See APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8.
87. See Forster, Women's Health DebateIntensifies, supra note 12, at 01 B (quoting a
Wisconsin physician who said "I don't do abortions, and if I refer a patient to someone
who does, I'm just as responsible for that abortion as if I did it myself."); see also
Pharmacists for Life International, Why a Conscience Clauses Is a Must... NOW!,
http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli=conscienceclausefaq (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
88.

HARVEY ET AL., supra note 78.

89.

Id.

90.

381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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Connecticut statutes in place at the time, one prohibiting the use of
contraceptive devices, the other made it illegal to counsel or abet another in
the commission of an offense. Thus, Griswold's actions were criminal under
the Connecticut law. Griswold challenged the law, saying that it violated an
implied privacy right in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Justice William 0. Douglas agreed, and, in his opinion for the court,
formulated the famous "penumbras" privacy right protection. 9 1 Douglas
argued that several fundamental rights were protected constitutionally,
despite not being mentioned in the Bill of Rights. That included rights such
as the right to raise one's own child,92 the right to study language in private
school, and the freedom to associate. Each right, while not delimited by an
Amendment, existed within the "penumbra" or shadow of other enumerated
rights. Since the Connecticut law did violate Griswold's rights in this
fashion, the statute, to pass muster, must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest-the strict scrutiny standard.9 3 Since the state had
not attempted to justify the basis of the statute, it was unconstitutional.
The individual's right to privacy with regard to contraception was later
refined by the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird.9 4 After delivering a college
lecture on contraception, Baird gave a contraceptive device to a young
woman in the audience. Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts law
which made it a felony for anyone besides a doctor or pharmacist to
distribute contraceptives to married couples. The law also criminalized any
attempt by anyone, doctors and pharmacists included, to distribute
contraceptives to unmarried persons.
The court held that the statute's
disparate treatment of individuals based on their matrimonial status violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s opinion gave
a broader outline to the right of privacy than had Griswold:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional make-up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. 96

91.

Id. at 484.

92.
93.
94.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Griswold,381 U.S. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).

95.
96.

Id. at 440-4 1.
Id. at 453.
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Five years later, in Carey v. Population Services International,97 Justice
Brennan wrote for the court that, when a state "burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for
the accomplishment of some state policy requires more than the unsupported
assertion.., that the burden is connected to such a policy." 98 Justice Brennan
added that strict scrutiny was required for restrictions on access to
contraceptives, "because such access is essential to exercise of the
constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that is
the underlying foundation
of the holdings" in Griswold, Eisenstadt and
99
subsequent cases.
Griswold and its progeny later formed the foundation for the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, which acknowledged a woman's fundamental right
to terminate a pregnancy. 00 The Texas statute in place at the time
criminalized abortion unless it was necessary to save the life of the mother.
Roe, a pregnant single woman, challenged the statute, saying that it violated
her right to privacy. The Court agreed, saying that a woman had a
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy in its earliest stages. 10l Such a
right was among those protected by the "penumbra" and emanation of the
Bill of Rights and other amendments, particularly the 14th Amendment's
concept of personal liberty.'0 2 The court disagreed with the State's
argument that the unborn child should be defined as a person.103
However, the court also recognized the state's compelling interest in
protecting unborn life. 10 4 Thus, the fundamental right to privacy is not
absolute. Instead, state regulation is appropriate regarding the timing of the
decision. The court's opinion, written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
established the "trimester" approach to balancing the conflicting rights of the
mother to end the pregnancy and the rights of the state to protect the future
life of the child. Within the first trimester, the rights of the mother are
paramount. Within the second trimester, the health of the mother becomes a
compelling interest for the state to protect, and thus regulation is appropriate.
In the last trimester, the rights of the state to' protect potential life are

97.

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

98.
99.

Id.at 679.
Id.at 688-89.

100. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101.

Id. at 163.

102.

Id. at 152-53.

103. Id. at 158. This decision which has import with regard to contraception, since it
impacts the definition of the beginning of life.
104.

Id. at 163.
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paramount unless it could be argued that
the procedure was necessary to
10 5
protect the life and health of the mother.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the right to privacy did not apply
to abortion, as the procedure was not performed in private, but rather with
the aid of other persons. 0 6 Thus, the appropriate test in Rehnquist's eyes
was the standard "rational basis" approach where simply relating the law to
a state purpose would be enough to validate it. The majority of °the
court
7
disagreed, recognizing a right for women to end their pregnancies.'
The Court's acknowledgment, that both sides of the case had valid and
compelling arguments, led it to the balancing approach of the trimester
framework. The trimester framework, however, was later abandoned by the
court in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey. 10 8 The Casey decision, authored by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, created a new standard by which the state's
interests would balance against the individual's interests-the "undue
burden" test. ° 9 The Court recognized the state's substantial interest in
potential life throughout pregnancy, but limited the protection of that interest
to regulations that would not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy.
Thus, the Constitution affords greater protection to government efforts to
regulate contraception (under the Griswold strict scrutiny standard) than 11it0
does efforts to regulate abortion (under Casey's undue burden standard).
Yet, the divergent case lines spring from a single source-the protection of
the individual rights of privacy implicitly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."'
The point of demarcation between the two lines of reasoning is society's
interest in incipient life, the unborn fetus. 112 Prior to the beginning of life,
strict scrutiny applies to any government attempt at regulation or

105. Id. at 163-64.
106. Id. at 172. Justice Rehnquist also joined in Justice White's dissent, published
separately. For their joint dissent, see 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
107. Id at 163.
108. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
109. Id. at 833.
110. Elizabeth A. Silverberg, Looking Beyond Judicial Deference to Agency
Discretion: A Fundamental Right of Access to RU486?, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1551,
1606 (1994).
Ill. Compare Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (referring to
"penumbral rights of privacy and repose") (citation omitted), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973) (referring to a right of privacy based variously in Bill of Rights and
14th Amendment).
112. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63 (state's compelling interest in protecting potential
human life permits degrees of abortion regulation after the end of first trimester of
pregnancy); Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 870 (state's compelling interest begins at
viability of fetus).
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restriction.11 3 Afterwards, such regulations must not impose an undue
burden on the individual's right to be pregnant or not pregnant. 114

B. First Amendment Jurisprudence-theRights of the Pharmacistas an
Individualand as an Employee
For pharmacists, as for any individual, a religiously-motivated right to
refuse to provide contraceptive drugs or devices, or to participate in an
abortion by providing an abortifacient drug to a pregnant woman, is
protected under the U.S. Constitution under the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's Free Exercise clause jurisprudence begins in 1878
with Reynolds v. United States."l 5 George Reynolds, a Mormon in Utah
Territory, was indicted for bigamy. Reynolds pled that he was required by
his religion to have more than one wife. The court disagreed, turning for
guidance to Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
written in 1802.116 Jefferson's letter is famous for coining the phrase "wall
of separation between Church and State,"1 7 but the letter was also the first
documentation of a distinction between religious action and religious
opinion. Jefferson noted that he believed "that religion is a matter which lies
solely between a man and his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach
actions only."' 118 Following Jefferson's distinction between action and
belief, the Court held that the government could intrude upon religious belief
inasmuch as it regulated "actions
which were in violation of social duties or
9
subversive of good order.""

113.

The concept of strict scrutiny-that a regulation is valid only if it is necessary

and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest-first arose in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a state law mandating sterilization of
certain felons). It is the most difficult threshold test that the Court can apply to any given
law. It can be applied to discern whether a law correctly balances competing rights of the
individual and the state.
114. See PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes
an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause").
115.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).

116.

Id. at 164.

117.

MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC

SOCIETY 92 (1996).
118.

ld.at93.

119.

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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The distinction between action and belief was further developed in
Cantwell v. Connecticut,12 which upheld the conviction of a group of
Jehovah's witnesses for violating a Connecticut law prohibiting solicitation
of funds to support religious causes from non-members of that religion
without prior approval of the government. 121 Noting that free exercise of
religion "embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to
act,"' 122 the Court then qualified the boundaries of those two freedoms by
declaring that "[t]he first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second
cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
12 3
society."

Twenty years later, in Braunfeldv. Brown, the Court held that "freedom to
act, even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not
totally free from legislative restrictions." 124 In Braunfeld, an Orthodox Jew
claimed that a Pennsylvania law that criminalized certain retail sales on
Sundays interfered with his freedom of religious expression. 125 Writing the
opinion of the court, Chief Justice Earl Warren used the distinction between
belief and action to uphold the law, noting that the statute "does not make
criminal the holding of any religious belief
or opinion, nor does it force
' 26
anyone to embrace any religious belief."'
In a sop to the petitioner, Warren noted that the statute did make the
practice of their religious beliefs "more expensive." 127 Yet again, the Court
refused to overturn the law, because "strik[ing] down, without the most
critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i.e. legislation which does not make unlawful the
religious practice
itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the
128
legislature."
Justice William Brennan dissented, noting that the law violated the free
exercise clause because it "put an individual to a choice between his
business and his religion." 129 Justice Potter Stewart went a step further than
Brennan, stating that a law that "compels a [religious believer] to choose

120.

310 U.S. 296 (1940).

121.

Id. at 301-02.

122.

Id. at 303.

123.

Id. at 303-04.

124.

366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04).

125.

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600-01.

126.

Id. at 603.

127.

Id. at 605.

128.

Id. at 606.

129.

Id. at 611.
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between his religious faith and his13economic
survival" is "a cruel choice"
0
and should not be allowed to stand.
Two years later, in Sherbert v. Verner, 131 the court tacked to the opposite
side. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist terminated for refusing to work
on Saturdays was denied unemployment compensation. 132 The South
Carolina State Supreme Court held that the petitioner's ineligibility for
benefits infringed no constitutional liberties because it "place[d] no
restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor [did] it in any way
prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe
her religious
' 133
beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience."
The U.S. Supreme Court thought otherwise, holding that a disqualification
of benefits under such circumstances imposes a burden on the free exercise
of religion: "the ruling forces [the religious believer] to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work on the otherhand."' 134 The Court instituted a balancing test for such
circumstances, requiring government actions that substantially burden a
religious practice be justified by a compelling state interest. 135 The Court
noted that there was no strong state interest at play3 in Sherbert in creating a
uniform day of rest,
as there was in Braunfeld. 36 It then reversed South
137
Carolina's court.
This more expansive reading of the First Amendment held sway for nearly
twenty-seven years, until the court retreated with its decision in Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith. 138 Two drug counselors in Oregon who were
terminated for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony were denied
unemployment compensation. 3 9 Since ingestion of peyote was a criminal
offense in Oregon, they were declared ineligible for benefits for engaging in
work-related misconduct.
The counselors sued, claiming a violation of their
140
free exercise rights.
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that reversed the
determination of ineligibility, holding that the criminality of the underlying

130. Id.at616.
131.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

132.
133.

Id. at 399.
Id.at 401.

134.

Id. at 404.

135.

Id. at 403-04.

136. Id. at408.
137.

Id. at410.

138. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
139. Id.at 874.
140. Id.
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conduct was not critical to decide the constitutional question.14' The court
reasoned that, since the purpose of the statute was not to enforce Oregon's
criminal laws, but rather to safeguard the finances of the state's
unemployment compensation fund, the state's purpose 14
were not compelling
enough to justify the restriction on religious expression. 1
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, and held instead that generally
applicable, religiously-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling state
interest. 143 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing the opinion for the Court, quoted
Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.
Gobitis:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not
relieve the 144
citizen
from the discharge
of political
responsibilities.
A key difference for the Court was that the action at stake in Sherbertrefusing to work on a Saturday-was not criminal, whereas in Smith the
action at stake-using peyote in a religious ceremony-was also a criminal
offense, because peyote was on the government's list of controlled
substances. 145 Since use of a controlled substance was illegal, the court
examined whether the prohibition of such use during a religious ceremony
was constitutionally permissible. 146
It held Sherbert's balancing test
inapplicable in such circumstances 147 and noted that:
[t]o make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent
upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where
the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of
his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself'-contradicts
both
148
constitutional tradition and common sense."'

141.

Id. at 875.

142.

Id.

Id. at 878-79.
144. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940)).
145. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963) (Appellant's request for
unemployment compensation denied) with Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (use of peyote is a
felony because the material is defined as a controlled substance).
146. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875-76.
147. Id. at 885.
143.
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This kind of approach also rules in the employment context, as it does in
the individual context, with regards to freedom of religious expression. In
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,149 an airline employee sued his
employer and labor union under Title VII after being terminated for refusing
to work on Saturdays due to religious beliefs. 15 The employee and the
airline proposed various alternatives to accommodate his needs, but no
workable solution could be found. 15' The airline had a system where those
employees with the most seniority had first choice for jobs within their
department. 152 When the employee switched jobs to a new department and
lost the seniority he had obtained at his prior position,
he was required to
153
work shifts that conflicted with his religious beliefs.
The employee requested to work only four days a week, but the employer
could not accommodate him-the position was essential, and the employee
was, at times, the only person available to work particular shifts. 154 It could
not reasonably accommodate the employee's religious exercise. 155 Justice
Byron White, writing for the court, held that an employer should attempt to
make a reasonable accommodation for the religious activities of its
employees, but was not required to impose an "undue hardship" upon
itself.156

Ill. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PHARMACISTS' RIGHT
OF CONSCIENCE

In W. V. State Bd.of Ed.v. Barnette, the court noted that when two rights
collide, the State must intervene "to determine where the rights of one end
and those of another begin."' 157 One way for society to balance these
competing interests is by drafting and implementing legislative conscience

148. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). Congress's
later attempt to override the Court's rule in Smith through the 1997 Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, or RFRA, was invalidated by the Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521

U.S. 507 (1997).
149.

432 U.S. 63 (1977).

150.

Id. at 63.

151.

Id.

152.

Id.at 67.

153.

Id.at 68.

154.
155.

Id.at 68-69.
Id.at 77 ("[i]t is our view that TWA made reasonable efforts to accommodate..."

the employee. Id.).

156.
157.

Id. at 81, 84.
319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943).
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clauses. Recognizing that the rights of patients and medical professionals
can clash in certain circumstances, most states have general conscience
clauses that protect health care••providers
158 from participating in procedures
However, these statutes may or
they believe are morally objectionable.
may not cover pharmacist's actions depending on how broadly they were
drafted.

A. Generaland Specific Conscience Clauses
Texas drafted a general conscience clause in 1973 which protects the
rights of medical professionals who do not wish to perform an abortion for
any reason.159 The statute states that only "[a] hospital or health care facility
may not discriminate against a physician, nurse, staff member, or employee,
or an applicant for one of those positions, who refuses to perform or
participate in an abortion procedure. 160 Strictly interpreted, it would
provide shelter only for a pharmacist employed by a hospital who is
approached by a doctor or patient with a written prescription slip for
mifepristone and who does not want to fill the prescription.' 61 The
protection created by the statute would only apply to a pharmacist that is
In addition, the statute
employed at a hospital or health care facility.
covers all grounds for a professionals' refusal to participate in an abortion,
whether for practical considerations or for religious reasons.163
However, a pharmacist employed by a retail drugstore or pharmacy would
not be covered under a strict interpretation of the statute and would be
required to fill the prescription. Similarly, a retail drugstore or pharmacy
provision and
would not fall under the "hospital or health care facility"
64
employee.'
an
such
against
discriminate
therefore
could
One question that arises is whether filling a validly written prescription is
equivalent to participating in an abortion. Neither law nor science seems to
be capable of answering this question at the present time, because it depends
on the definition of conception, a definition that has eluded certainty. The
Supreme Court did not address the subject in Roe.
Another question created by the Texas statute, is whether a pharmacist is
considered a health care provider. That question, at least with respect to

158.

See Wardle, supra note 5.

159.

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §103.002 (2005).

160. Id.
161. Id. This assumes, of course, that a hospital pharmacist would be considered a
"staff member" or "employee."
162.

Id.

163.

Id.

164.

TEX. OCC.CODE ANN. § 103.002 (2005).
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1 65
analogous medical malpractice statutes, varies according to state law.
Texas state law contributes to the confusion by restricting the performance
of abortions to physicians licensed to practice within the state.' 66 Since
pharmacists are not physicians, they are arguably opening themselves up to
legal liability if they allow themselves to participate or perform an abortion.
In contrast to Texas, South Dakota drafted a pharmacist-specific
conscience clause statute in 1998. South Dakota law governing pharmacists
begins by defining the practice of pharmacy. 67 It lists three specific duties:
"[i]nterpretation and evaluation of prescription drug orders and dispensing in
the patient's best interests;" "[p]rovision of counseling and care;" and "[t]he
responsibility for compounding, distributing, labeling, storing and tracking
drugs."' 168 This definition is intriguing because it includes a subjective
standard for pharmacists' duty which requires that they must interpret and
evaluate prescription drug orders.
Pharmacists are not allowed, under South Dakota law, to prescribe drugs
as a medical practitioner or to dispense drugs without a prescription drug
order. 69 The South Dakota decided that licensed doctors write out the
prescription, but do not have access or the ability to fill prescriptions.
Pharmacists, on the other hand, are without the authority to write a
prescription, but do have the power to use their discretion to act as a
gatekeeper for the dispensing of powerful prescription drugs.
With the role of the pharmacist drawn explicitly, South Dakota's
conscience clause delineates the boundaries of a pharmacists' ability to
follow his or her conscience with regard to several specific actions. In so
doing, it respects the doctor's role, the patient's best interests (as determined
by the pharmacist using his or her skill and training) and the pharmacists'
duties. The statute indicates that "[n]o pharmacist may be required to
dispense medication if there is reason to believe that the medication would
be used to: (1) cause an abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child as defined
in subdivision 22-1-2(50A); or (3) Cause the death of any person by means
of an assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing." 170

165. See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Who Are
"Health Care Providers" or the Like, Whose Actions Fall within Statutes Specifically
Governing Actions and Damagesfor Medical Malpractice,12 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2005).
166.
167.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.003 (2005).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §36-11-2.2 (1999).

168.

Id.

169.

Id.

170.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §36-11-70 (1999).
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South Dakota law defines an unborn child broadly, encompassing any
human organism from "fertilization until live birth."''1 South Dakota law
states that "[n]o such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section
may be the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist or the
pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, recriminatory,
or discriminatory action against the pharmacist."'' 7 2 Thus, the South Dakota
law is quite specific while simultaneously accounting for several different
ethical quandaries facing pharmacists.
Admittedly, federal legislation would preempt state statutes with regard to
conscientious refusal to work if it were to pass both houses of Congress and
obtain signature by the President. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act
(WRFA) would have required employers to accommodate the religious
principles of workers, unless significant difficulty or expense would result
from the accommodation. 7 3 On April 11, 2003, Mr. Santorum (R-PA)
introduced the bill to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
require employers to "remove... conflict[s] between emplo7ment
requirements and the [employees'] religious observance or practice...."
Despite having broad bipartisan support, however, the American Civil
Liberties Union opposed the WRFA because they feared that it would be
used as a shield for racial or sexual discrimination. 7 5 The bill languished in
committee, suffering the same fate as many of the state religious conscience
clauses with regard to pharmacists.

B. Common Law ProtectionsFrom Liability
Beyond legislative exemptions, however, pharmacists also find a degree
of protection in the common law Learned Intermediary Doctrine. The
doctrine provides that prescription drug and medical device makers can
satisfy their duty of care to patients by providing warnings to the prescribing
physician. 176 Doctors bear the burden of warning since they are the
professionals who are legally allowed to prescribe medication. 177 While

171. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §22-1-2(50A) defines an "unborn child" as "an individual
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth."
172.

Id.

173. Josh Gerstein, Santorum Finds Friend in Kerry, At Least on Religion in
Workplace, N. Y. SuN, July 13, 2004, at 1.
174.

S. 893, 108th Congress, 1st Session.

175.

Gerstein, supra note 173, at 1

176. James Barney, Dancing Toward Disaster or the Race to Rationality: The Demise
of the Learned Intermediary Standardand the Pharmacists"Duty to Warn, 39 GONz. L.
REV. 399, 404 (2004).
177.

Id. at 405.

Spring 2006]

An EssentialPrescription

pharmacists are held to an "average practitioner" standard of care when
filling a prescription, in general they are excused from liability for harmful
drug interactions or side effects. 7 8
Critics and several recent cases have, however, questioned the continuing
vitality of this common law doctrine.' 79 Since "pharmacists are last in the
chain of drug distribution," these critics argue that pharmacists should have
a "duty to warn customers
of adverse side effects and contraindications of
' 80
[filled] prescriptions."'
In general, courts have been reluctant to impose a duty to warn of adverse
side effects on pharmacists.' 8' Requiring pharmacists to adhere to such
principles could, in fact, violate the doctor-patient relationship and "force...
pharmacists to practice medicine without a license."' 182 Drug makers,
arguably, have already fulfilled the warning requirement to the patient by
providing the warnings and information to the doctor.' 83 In addition, since
the proper prescribing of any drug must take into account each patient's
individual characteristics, symptoms and history, physicians are arguably in
a better position than pharmacists to determine whether any given drug is
appropriate. 184
Interestingly, the pendulum has swung the other way in other recent cases,
at least with regard to warning of adverse drug interactions when the
specifics of the situation are known to the pharmacist. 185 Pharmacies that
voluntarily offer services that purport to alert patients to dangerous drug
interactions have been held to have voluntarily assumed a duty to warn of
any potentially harmful interactions that are relevant to the particular
patient. 186 Some courts have explicitly rejected the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine and instead have held that pharmacists have a duty to warn patients
of drug interactions when they know that a specific patient is taking the
drugs in question.'87

178.

Id.

179.

Id. at 406.

180.

Id.

181. See Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App. 2000); Jones v.
Irvin, 602 F.Supp. 399 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
182. See Nichols v. Central Merchandise, Inc., 817 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991); see also Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E. 2d 551 (11. App. Ct. 1985); Moore
ex rel. Moore v. Mem. Hosp. of Gulfport, 825 So.2d 658 (Miss. 2002).
183.

Nichols, 817P.2dat 1134.

184.

Moore ex rel. Moore, 825 So.2d at 664.

185.

McKee v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash. 1989).

186.

Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).

187. Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118 (Ill. 2002). For more
substantial background on the Happel case, see Bob Neiner, A New Cure for
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Such an exception to the doctrine is founded upon such considerations as
the foreseeability of harm, the likelihood of injury to the patient, the
magnitude of the burden of imposing a duty, and the consequences on
pharmacists of imposing a duty. 88 In a modem pharmacy, where patient
records are tracked by computer and interactions between previously
dispensed medications can be automatically flagged, thus alleviating some
of the pharmacist's burden, the benefits to the patient's health and safety
may outweigh the burdens of the new duty.

IV. COURT DECISIONS BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES

When faced with parties seeking protection under existing state
conscience clauses, courts have taken three basic approaches to cases
involving their application to pharmacist duties. In some cases, they have
read the conscience clause narrowly so as to exclude the person or institution
seeking its protection. In other cases, the courts have held the clause
applicable and ruled in favor of the party refusing to perform services. In a
third line of cases involving Title VII claims, they have instituted a
balancing of interests. By instituting the undue burden test within Title VII,
the Supreme Court recognized the balancing of rights necessary between
employers and employees. 189 Such balancing is instructive of the approach
that courts take when faced with two sets of conflicting, constitutionallygrounded rights.

A. Narrow andBroad Readings
In one Pennsylvania case, a hospital admissions clerk claimed that
performing the necessary clerical operations to admit patients seeking an
abortion violated her religious beliefs. 190 The hospital had attempted to
accommodate her beliefs by finding her a different shift for her to work that
would not include abortion patients, but terminated her after she refused
several alternative offers. She sued the hospital under Pennsylvania's
conscience clause, which held that no doctor, nurse, or staff member could
be forced to participate in an abortion.' 91 The court ruled for her employer,

Contraindication:Illinois Supreme Court Prescribesa Duty to Warn on Pharmacists,28
S. ILL. U. L.J. 483 (2004).
188.

See Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 730.

189.

See, e.g., supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.

190. Spellacy v. Tri-County Hospital, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
Com. P1. Mar. 23, 1798), aff'd., 395 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
191.

43 P.S. §955.2(a)(2002)

8870 (Pa. Ct.
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noting that the statute only covered professionals who were "directly
involved" with the procedure. 192 Since the clerk was never required to
the confines
directly participate in the procedure, she was held to be outside
93
of the statute, and her termination was deemed appropriate.1
For individuals who do fit statutory definitions of covered personnel,
courts have considered such statutes as bright-line protections. For instance,
in a case where a nurse-anesthetist in a isolated rural medical facility refused
to assist in sterilization procedures and was subsequently terminated from
employment, the highest state court ruled that the state's conscience clause,
which covered sterilization practices, provided her with an unqualified right
to refuse.' 94 While a lower court had ruled against the nurse, noting that the
lack of other medical facilities or replacement personnel in the area imposed
an undue burden on the patient and the hospital, the higher court found such
burdens to be irrelevant when clearly confronted by an applicable statute. 19

B. Title VII "Balancing"
The interaction between the dual interests of notice to patients impacted
by a refusal to perform services on the one hand, and public health, safety
and welfare policy on the other, is most clearly seen in cases where courts
have balanced competing claims to protected rights within a Title VII
employment context. Generally, in such situations, "as long as the employer
has offered a reasonable accommodation for the employee-in other words,
as long as the employer has made a fair effort to minimize potential conflicts
between the employee's
work and his or her religious beliefs-the employer
' 196
will generally win."
In Rodriguez v. City of Chicago,197 a Roman Catholic police officer
brought a Title VII claim against the City of Chicago in order to be
98
exempted from patrolling and guarding abortion clinics in his precinct.'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling to

192.

Spellacy, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at

193.

Id. The Court also held that since the hospital had attempted to accommodate the

8871.

clerk's religious beliefs, and since further attempts would be an undue hardship, the clerk
had no cognizable claim under Title VII. Id.
194. Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979).
195. Id.at 709-10.
196. Conflicts Between Religious Refusals and Women's Health: How the Courts
Respond, REPROD. FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS THREATS TO REPROD. RTs. (ACLU/Reprod.
Freedom Project, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 22, 2002, at 4. See also supra notes 149-156 and

accompanying text.
197. 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 772-74.
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reject the officer's claim, because the officer had refused the city's offer to
transfer him, without loss of pay or benefits, to other precincts that did not
have abortion clinics. 199 Chief Judge Richard Posner, in his concurrence,
explained the rejection by noting:
[t]he objection to recusal... is not inconvenience to the police
department.... The objection is to the loss of public confidence in
governmental protective services if the public knows that its
protectors are at liberty to pick and choose whom to protect. The
public knows that its protectors have a private agenda; everybody
to think that they leave that agenda at home
does. But it would like 200
when they are on duty.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals took a similar tack in Shelton v.
University of Medicine & Dentistry,20 1 in which a labor and delivery room
nurse refused to assist during any procedures in which the life of an unborn
child might be threatened either directly or indirectly. 20 2 On one occasion,
she refused to participate in an emergency procedure for a pregnant woman
with a ruptured membrane. 2 03 On another, she refused to assist in an
emergency Caesarian-section for a woman who had complete placenta
previa that caused the patient to bleed profusely-the procedure was
necessary to save the patient's life. 204 After having refused the option to
transfer to a position in the newborn intensive care unit, the nurse was
fired. 2 0 5 The court determined that:
public protectors such as police and firefighters must be neutral in
providing their services. We would include public health care
providers among such public protectors. Although we do not
interpret Title VII to require a presumption of undue burden, we
believe public trust and confidence requires that a public hospital's
health care practitioners-with professional ethical obligations to
care for the sick and injured-will provide treatment in time of
206
emergency.

199.

Id. at 778; See Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 975 F.Supp. 1055, 1059 (N.D. Ill.

1997) (detailing the city's attempts to make reasonable accommodations for the officer's
religious beliefs).
200. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
201. 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
202. Id. at 222 n. I. The hospital at which Shelton worked did not perform elective

abortions, but emergency abortions were performed occasionally to safeguard the life and
health of patients. Id.

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 228.
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C. Balancing and the Brownfield Decision
Balancing has also been used beyond the Title VII context. In Brownfield
v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital,20 7 a California appellate court read the
state's conscience clause, which exempted religiously-affiliated hospitals
from liability for not providing abortion services, 20 narrowly as it weighed
the competing concerns of patient, health care provider, and society within a
malpractice context. A rape victim sued a Roman Catholic-affiliated
2 1°
hospital for refusing either to give her ECP or to inform her about it.
The
victim asked for equitable remedies, including an injunction, but asked for
no damages. The trial court sustained the hospital's demurrer due to the
insufficiency of21the victim's factual pleadings and her requested types of
equitable relief. 1
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding
that the hospital's failure to inform the victim about ECP did not amount to
an unfair practice in that it did not amount to an "unfair, dishonest,
deceptive, destructive, fraudulent, or discriminatory practice." 21 2 Further, the
court held that:
[W]hen a rape victim can allege... that a skilled practitioner of
good standing would have provided her with information
concerning and access to estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis under
similar circumstances; that if such information had been provided
to her she would have elected such treatment; and that damages
have proximately resulted from the failure to provide her with
information concerning this treatment option, said rape victim
21 3 can
state a cause of action for damages for medical malpractice.
Since the victim in this case could not offer enough facts to show current
or prospective injuries suffered by herself or the public that could not be
compensated by legal damages, 214 the appellate court found that the trial
court was correct in its ruling.
By ruling in the method that it did, the court explicitly left the door open
to liability for refusal to fill a valid prescription for birth control pills if the
pharmacist believes, in good faith, that the pills will be used to end a life that

207.
208.
210.
211.

208 Cal. App. 3d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West. 1995)(formerly § 25955).
Brownfield, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 408-09.
Id. at409.

212.

Id.at 411,

213.

Id. at 414 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245 (1972).

214.

Id.
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has been conceived but has not yet been implanted. With no definition of
abortion in the statute, the California court did not investigate or attempt to
discover the legislative intent behind the statute. 215 It read the statute
narrowly, leaving the question open for later cases.
While in this case the victim could not allege facts demonstrating that she
or the general public had suffered or would suffer injuries that could not be
compensated by an award of damages, 216 the court's view on whether
dispensing birth control pills to be used as emergency contraception
constituted an abortion is illuminating. The California appellate court held
that providing emergency contraception was a preventative measure, not a
terminative measure. 2 17 Such a determination indicates that the court will
follow the scientifically accepted definition of pregnancy, and thus, will not
allow pharmacists to define pregnancy to include embryos that have been
conceived but not implanted. 18 California's conscience clause lists abortion
as an act from which a medical
professional can abstain only for "moral,
2 19
ethical, or religious" reasons.
The California court's position poses a problem for pharmacists
nationwide, because most general conscience clauses at the state level cover
abortion but do not cover emergency contraception. 220 In fact, neither
assisted suicide nor euthanasia is covered by the California conscience
clause. 2 2 Abortion is defined as the termination of pregnancy-yet
pregnancy itself is not defined. 222 The same problem affects many other
broadly written state statutes.223

V. COSTS OF BALANCING AND THE NECESSITY OF PHARMACIST-SPECIFIC
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES

Given the foregoing applications of "general" health care provider
conscience clauses in the courts, the odds seem stacked against any
individual pharmacist seeking to abstain from actions that violate the

215.

Wardle, supranote 5, at 200.

216.

Brownfield, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 414.

217. Donald W. Herbe, The Right To Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protectionfor a
Pharmacist'sRight To Refuse FacilitationofAbortion and Emergency Contraception, 17

J.L. & HEALTH 77, 99 (2002-3) (citing Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256
Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
218.
219.

Id.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a), supra note 207.

220.
221.
222.
223.

Herbe, supra note 217, at 97-98 (citing numerous statutes).
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a), supra note 207.
Id.
Herbe, supra note 217, at 98.
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pharmacist's religious or moral principles. The foregoing cases reveal that
courts have balanced the needs of health
care providers against the needs of
224
patients and, by implication, society.
Undoubtedly, several important public policies are furthered by ensuring
pharmacists dispense properly prescribed medications regardless of their
personal moral or ethical views. First, the possibility of discrimination is
reduced by requiring pharmacists to fill all prescriptions regardless of their
225
personal views . Second, patients would not be confused over the issue of
liability for incorrect prescriptions, since the Learned Intermediary standard
would suggest such liability remains with doctors and drug makers. 226 Third,
pharmacists could be encouraged by the lack of liability to second-guess
doctors' prescriptions, and therefore, assume more than their fair share of
gate-keeping duties.227
In addition, the larger trend toward patient-centric medicine 228 suggests
patient's desires for treatment should take priority. The APhA's own ethics
clause acknowledges this trend by downplaying the prevention of harm to a
patient (non-maleficence) while strongly highlighting the 229
autonomy of the
patient and acting for the good of the patient (beneficence).
In terms of individual rights, a patient's 14th Amendment right to
contraception is solidly established, 230 and the absence of a high court ruling
on when life begins complicates both ECP and chemically-induced abortion
issues. At the same time, the First Amendment rights of pharmacists seem to
be more limited due to the necessity of following neutral, generally
applicable laws in the expression of religious beliefs.23'
General conscience clauses and their related jurisprudence are clearly
inadequate when applied to the changing substance of modem pharmacy.
First, the orientation of the profession of pharmacy itself is moving away
from functionalism and toward patient interaction.
Such a shift implies the
necessity of providing pharmacists with the authority to make difficult

224. See supra Section IV and accompanying notes.
225. Mississippi's very broad conscience clause, for instance, specifically forbids
coverage of refusals based on "race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed
or sexual orientation." MIss. CODE. ANN. §41-107-5(1) (West 2004).
226. See supra Section III.B and accompanying text; see also Barney, supra note 176,
at 413, 414-15.
227. See Barney, supra note 176, at 413, 415-16.
228. See APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4; see also supra Section L.C for a
discussion of the pharmacy profession's changing view of its role in health care.
229. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Section lI.A and related notes.
231. See supra Section II.B and related notes.
232. See supra Section L.C and related notes.
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decisions in light of their personal judgment. 233 Secondly, decreasing
common law protections and the imposition of new social duties at both the
state and federal level, including the duty to warn, as medicine becomes
more complicated indicates that pharmacists are assuming more
responsibility for positive patient outcomes.
Third, society continues to have a social interest in pharmacists acting as
gatekeepers to prevent the illicit use of prescription drugs, and to prevent
harm to patients. Fourth, as modem pharmaceutical science advances, drugs
are increasingly able to accomplish chemically that which only physical
procedures could do in the past, 234 thereby putting more power and potential
liability at the doorstep of pharmacists. Finally, there is a valid public policy
rationale to ensuring that those choosing to join the ranks of pharmacists are
not only well-trained, but are ethical, conscientious individuals. Pharmacists
must be able to resist dispensing invalid prescriptions or dispensing drugs
that they know will harmfully interact with another drug.
The foregoing reasons suggest that pharmacists are increasingly in a
position akin to physicians with regard to the patients that they treat. Much
like physicians, they have responsibility for using their own professional
judgment to secure public health and safety. In order to protect the members
of the profession from inevitable conflicts with personal moral or religious
values, a measure of legal protection in the form of conscience clauses
should cover their actions, much as the actions of doctors are covered in
most states.235

CONCLUSION

Critics of conscience clauses have held that such statutes should be
narrowly restricted to purely sectarian institutions. 236 Any type of connection
to the public world would require the institution, and the people operating

233. See supra Section L.C and D and related notes.
234. For instance, an abortion can now be accomplished through the use of
mifepristone instead of a surgical abortion procedure. See supra Section 1.B and related
notes.
235.

See APHA POLICY REPORT, supra note 8.
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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2002), http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/

refusal report sum.pdf ("While entities operating in the public world ought to play by
public rules, churches, temples, [and] mosques... ought generally to be free of the
requirements of laws repugnant to their beliefs. A church should not have to include
coverage for contraception in a health benefit plan for ministers and other clerics.").
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within it, to conform to secular principles.
In short, such critics argue that
if an individual or institution is "[i]n the public world, they should play by
public rules." 238 Such a test would add to another requirement prior to
validation of a conscience clause that no burden be imposed on any other
individual. 239 Any type of burden that would be imposed on another person
by a pharmacist's morally
or religiously motivated refusal would be grounds
24
to nullify the exemption. 0
The problem with this two-pronged analysis of conscience clauses is more
than simply holding the ethical code of the actor-in this case, the
pharmacist-to be lower in value than the person seeking the benefits of the
action-the patient. In so doing, the pharmacist is treated as a mere
functionary, able to operate only within the parameters dictated by the
patient. But more importantly, it runs contrary to the changing nature of
pharmaceutical care-and that nature is changing due to social demands
placed upon pharmacists by advancing medical and pharmaceutical science.
Pharmacists are asked to be the gatekeepers that protect society from those
who would abuse powerful drugs; yet they are supposed to check their
consciences at the door while they do so. They are supposed to be thinking,
rational actors in the transaction and exercise their own judgment and
initiative-yet, should a religious or moral scruple intrude, they are expected
to be mere robotic functionaries.
Such a view is inherently flawed and does not reflect the modem reality in
which pharmacists find themselves. Following such a view would require
some pharmacists to violate one of the principle ethical goals of their
profession-non-maleficence. 241 If a pharmacist holds non-maleficence as a
primary duty, the pharmacist must refuse to cooperate
in a procedure that
242
will result in the death of a living human being.
The only solution to this dilemma may be the solution that the APhA
suggested, namely, to endorse a conscience clause, but simultaneously
require pharmacists to refer a valid prescription to another service provider.
Those members of the profession who bear the burden of this course of
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action are those who believe that a referral is equivalent to the act itself.
However, such a view safeguards most of the ethical goals of pharmacists
while simultaneously serving the public need for effective provision of
legally prescribed drugs.

